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The semantic–semiotic distinction is associated with Benveniste (1969): indeed, his reaction to Peirce’s pan-semioticism was justified from his own standpoint and reflected a clear theoretical vision. Yet, it transcends the specificity of his positions and remains important even when it is not explicitly addressed.
Broadly speaking, theories of language and the sign can be distinguished according to whether or not they regard this pair as theoretically relevant. Here are some sketchy examples:
Peirce grants no special semiotic status to languages; consequently, he has no reason to maintain the distinction. Within his framework, linguistic signs do not differ in any respect from other signs.
Theories such as Benveniste and Prieto’s recognize the relevance (and the necessity) of this distinction. For them, semantics is endowed with structural autonomy. It is a closed system, yet it necessarily points beyond itself in order to orient knowledge and action. It is an indispensable level, but not a final one. Indeed, this double passage constitutes the very basis of human beings’ cognitive and practical uniqueness: it is precisely what makes it possible to unite the world of the intellect with the world of action
Jakobson and other structural semiotic approaches proceed by extending linguistic categories analogically—though not homologously—to non-linguistic objects.
Greimas conceives of the monde naturel as a second language. Although he “formally” dispenses with semantics—and with meaning in favor of sense—he nevertheless treats semantically even that which is not, or not entirely, language in the narrow sense, using the same tools employed to analyze language itself.
For Barthes, the domain of non-linguistic signs is subsumed under that of language, rather than the other way around. Language thus appears to be the only “world” we inhabit. This approach points beyond semiotics and, indeed, has counterparts outside the field.
Other positions, such as those of Hjelmslev and Eco, are more difficult to frame in terms of a clear-cut opposition between the semiotic and the semantic.
Naturally, it’s not the whole story: a wide range of issues and subject is related to this quandary. Here are only some possible subjects for communications:
Is actually language (langue) endowed with structural autonomy in respect to other sign systems?
Is there really something as a hierarchy of signs (with linguistic signs at its top)?
Semantic theories should be divided into semiotic and a-semiotic ones?
How do 4E semantics deal (or should deal) with semiotics?
Do all-encompassing semiotic theories (such as Peirce’s) need a separate semantic dimension? And, if not, do they lack something?
In the communications, these questions (and related ones) should be addressed through close examination of specific authors and theories that either explicitly thematize the distinction between the semantic and the semiotic, leave it unthematized, or tacitly presuppose it.
Submissions in English, French, and Portuguese will be evaluated.
References
Barthes, R. 1967. Elements of Semiology. Hill and Wang.
Eco, U. 1976. A theory of semiotics. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
Eco, U. 1984. Semiotics and the philosophy of language. London: Macmillan.
Greimas, A. J., & Courtés, J. 1979. Sémiotique. Paris: Hachette.
Hjelmslev, L. 1961 [1943]. Prolegomena to a theory of language. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press.
Jakobson, R. 1963. Essais de linguistique générale, Paris, Minuit.
Jakobson, R. 1977. ‘A Few Remarks on Peirce, Pathfinder in the Science of Language’. Modern Language Notes, 92(5): 1026–32.
Joseph, J. E. (ed.) 2025. The Bloomsbury Handbook of Saussure. NY: Bloomsbury.
Peirce, Ch. S. 1931–58. Collected Papers, Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss and A. W. Burks (eds), 8 vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP.
Prieto, Luís J. 1975. Pertinence et pratique. Paris: Minuit.
Saussure, Ferdinand de 1959 [19222]. Course in General Linguistics, New York: Philosophical Library.
Broadly speaking, theories of language and the sign can be distinguished according to whether or not they regard this pair as theoretically relevant. Here are some sketchy examples:
Peirce grants no special semiotic status to languages; consequently, he has no reason to maintain the distinction. Within his framework, linguistic signs do not differ in any respect from other signs.
Theories such as Benveniste and Prieto’s recognize the relevance (and the necessity) of this distinction. For them, semantics is endowed with structural autonomy. It is a closed system, yet it necessarily points beyond itself in order to orient knowledge and action. It is an indispensable level, but not a final one. Indeed, this double passage constitutes the very basis of human beings’ cognitive and practical uniqueness: it is precisely what makes it possible to unite the world of the intellect with the world of action
Jakobson and other structural semiotic approaches proceed by extending linguistic categories analogically—though not homologously—to non-linguistic objects.
Greimas conceives of the monde naturel as a second language. Although he “formally” dispenses with semantics—and with meaning in favor of sense—he nevertheless treats semantically even that which is not, or not entirely, language in the narrow sense, using the same tools employed to analyze language itself.
For Barthes, the domain of non-linguistic signs is subsumed under that of language, rather than the other way around. Language thus appears to be the only “world” we inhabit. This approach points beyond semiotics and, indeed, has counterparts outside the field.
Other positions, such as those of Hjelmslev and Eco, are more difficult to frame in terms of a clear-cut opposition between the semiotic and the semantic.
Naturally, it’s not the whole story: a wide range of issues and subject is related to this quandary. Here are only some possible subjects for communications:
Is actually language (langue) endowed with structural autonomy in respect to other sign systems?
Is there really something as a hierarchy of signs (with linguistic signs at its top)?
Semantic theories should be divided into semiotic and a-semiotic ones?
How do 4E semantics deal (or should deal) with semiotics?
Do all-encompassing semiotic theories (such as Peirce’s) need a separate semantic dimension? And, if not, do they lack something?
In the communications, these questions (and related ones) should be addressed through close examination of specific authors and theories that either explicitly thematize the distinction between the semantic and the semiotic, leave it unthematized, or tacitly presuppose it.
Submissions in English, French, and Portuguese will be evaluated.
References
Barthes, R. 1967. Elements of Semiology. Hill and Wang.
Eco, U. 1976. A theory of semiotics. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
Eco, U. 1984. Semiotics and the philosophy of language. London: Macmillan.
Greimas, A. J., & Courtés, J. 1979. Sémiotique. Paris: Hachette.
Hjelmslev, L. 1961 [1943]. Prolegomena to a theory of language. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press.
Jakobson, R. 1963. Essais de linguistique générale, Paris, Minuit.
Jakobson, R. 1977. ‘A Few Remarks on Peirce, Pathfinder in the Science of Language’. Modern Language Notes, 92(5): 1026–32.
Joseph, J. E. (ed.) 2025. The Bloomsbury Handbook of Saussure. NY: Bloomsbury.
Peirce, Ch. S. 1931–58. Collected Papers, Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss and A. W. Burks (eds), 8 vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP.
Prieto, Luís J. 1975. Pertinence et pratique. Paris: Minuit.
Saussure, Ferdinand de 1959 [19222]. Course in General Linguistics, New York: Philosophical Library.